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ABSTRACT

The thesis attempts to place smuggling on the Warsaw Ghetto until the Great
Deportation into the larger context of economic warfare as a Nazi policy. This largely
overlooked aspect of Jewish response provides valuable insights to the larger debate
because of the experimental nature of administration in the Government General and its
potential impact on determining the course of the Final Solution. The paper alleges that
Jewish smuggling was less a form of resistance than an aid in alleviating German
responsibility for their captives’ welfare and an effective method of management.
Research tools included an abundance of primary documents for finding the basic facts
and incidents of smuggling. Secondary research established the arguments to seat the
discussion in. Smuggling is viewed alongside the policies that made it necessary
including the city’s takeover, landscape adjustments harshening decrees and the
establishment of the ghetto. The work’s greatest value lays in the possibility of
facilitating a greater understanding of the larger Nazi policy framework.

iii

INTRODUCTION
Jewish smuggling was a fulfillment of the Nazi goals of economic warfare in
Poland. Before the military reverses in the Russian campaign that began 22 June 1941
and the escalation to indiscriminate slaughter of Jews, all policies pointed to a Jewish
world separate from the Aryan one that would rely on complex interactions to achieve
Nazi objectives. Stealing property, limiting wealth, manipulating strength and
ghettoization were steps in the creation of an artificial world. The finishing touch on this
world was the debasement of Jews to such a degree that they could not even operate in
the same market, use the same currency or live beyond a subsistence level. As Jews
snuck over or through the wall, bribed gate guards and received contraband, some
quarters received confirmation that their ambitions were being realized.
Eventually, segregation would prove insufficient. But this study focuses on the
period from the Nazi victory over Poland in 1939 until early 1942, when strict
enforcement of the death decree for smugglers became the norm and the Great
Deportation began. Until then, smuggling served some Nazi purposes and was therefore
tolerated or even encouraged.
The Warsaw Ghetto was the consequence and embodiment of Nazi economic
policy expressed in land. Separating races, claiming land and removing undesirables were
all bound up as the practical motivators and outcomes of racial invective. When it came
time for application in Eastern Europe, the policy evolved in unpredictable ways but had
one effect no matter how it was applied or the infighting that accompanied it. Reality was
reconstructed. Social landscapes changed in advance of the physical one. In the chaos
that frequently characterized Nazi Jewish policy, economic warfare of one shade or
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another was a consistent factor. The application and aims of economic policy varied,
another characteristic of Nazi administration, and the typical political infighting and
mercurial outlooks accounted for as many procedural alterations in regard to European
Jewry as the changing fortunes of war.
Warsaw’s Jewish Ghetto is a case in point. Jews had lived in Warsaw since at
least the 14th century. Despite prevalent anti-Semitism, Poland had been tolerant enough
to cause some wonder at the close resemblance between the word Poland and the Hebrew
term polin, meaning ‘here thou shalt lodge in exile.’ 1 Before World War II there were 33
million Polish citizens, 3.3 million of them Jews. Fifty percent of all Polish artisans were
Jewish.2 Eighty percent of Warsaw’s craftsmen were Jews. 3 Under Nazi occupation, this
accommodation changed. Plans evolved as the result of power struggles and changing
fortunes of war. The only certainty was that from Warsaw’s capitulation on 27 September
1939, the city’s Jewish population became the unfortunate victims in a grand Nazi
experiment aimed at erasing Jewish influence. 4 The experiment’s conclusion is well

1

Eva Hoffman, Shtetl: The Life and Death of a Small Town and the World of Polish Jews (New York:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997), 10.
2
Josef Kermisz, Raul Hilberg & Stanislaw Staron, ed., The Warsaw Diary of Adam Czerniakow: Prelude
to Doom (New York: Stein and Day, 1979), 2 & 77.
3
Christopher Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September
1939-March 1942. (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press and Yad Vashem, 2004), 121.
4
For an overview of ghettoization, the Nazi policies which created ghettoes, and the evolution of the
Warsaw Ghetto, see Christopher Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi
Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942 (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem Press, 2004); Raul Hilberg The
Destruction of the European Jews (New Haven; Yale University Press, 2003); Israel Gutman The Jews of
Warsaw: Ghetto, Underground, Revolt, 1939-1943 (Bloomington, Indiana; Indiana University Press,
1982); Charles G. Roland Courage Under Siege: Starvation, Disease, and Death in the Warsaw Ghetto
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Larissa Z. Ziedens, “Optimism and Revolt of the Oppressed:
A Comparison of Two Polish Jewish Ghettos of World War II,” Political Psychology 18 (1997); For more
information about Ghetto government see: Isaiah Trunk, Judenrat: The Jewish Councils of Eastern Europe
Under Nazi Occupation (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972); Raul Hilberg, Stanislaw Staron, and
Josef Kermisz, ed, The Warsaw Diary of Adam Czerniakow: Prelude to Doom (New York; Stein and Day,
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known. The intervening steps, though no less sinister, are the subject of greater debate.
Between 1939 and 1943, economic warfare reached an acme of expropriation,
exploitation and exile. One Jewish response to this persecution was smuggling. While it
is frequently lauded as a life-saving measure, even a form of resistance, smuggling had a
sinister side. 5
The idea that smuggling could have served Nazi interests or been an outward sign
of achieving their goals borders on sacrilege. The act has long been held up as a glorious,
even life-affirming example of resistance; if it did not always strike at Nazi oppressors, at
least it hindered their ultimate goal, the annihilation of European Jewry. Yehuda Bauer
defines resistance as “any group action consciously taken in opposition to known or
surmised laws, actions or intentions directed against the Jews by the Germans and their
collaborators.” 6 Roger Gottlieb defines resistance as “acts motivated by the intention to
thwart, limit, to end the exercise of power of the oppressor group over the oppressed.” 7

1979); Raul Hilberg, “The Ghetto as a Form of Government” Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science 450 (1980). For more about resistance in the Warsaw Ghetto see: Israel Gutman,
Resistance: The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994); Isaiah Trunk,
Jewish Responses to Nazi Persecution: Collective and Individual Behavior in Extremis (New York: Stein
and Day, 1979); Reuben Ainsztein, Jewish Resistance in Nazi-Occupied Eastern Europe: with a historical
survey of the Jew as fighter and soldier in the Diaspora (New York: Harper & Row, 1974); Barbara Stern
Burstin, “The Warsaw Ghetto: A Shattered Window on the Holocaust,” The History Teacher 13 (1980);
Emil Fackenheim, “The Spectrum of Jewish Resistance During the Holocaust: An Essay in Description and
Definition” Modern Judaism 2 (1982); Michael R. Marrus, “Jewish Resistance to the Holocaust” Journal of
Contemporary History 30 (1995). For more about the life of Warsaw’s Jews, see: Abraham I. Katsh, ed.,
The Warsaw Diary of Chaim A. Kaplan (New York: Collier Books, 1973); Jacob Sloan, ed., Notes From
the Warsaw Ghetto: The Journal of Emanuel Ringelblum (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.,
1958); Betty Jean Lifton, The King of Children: The Life and Death of Janusz Korczak (New York: St.
Martin’s Griffin, 1988); Gunnar S. Paulsson Secret City: The Hidden Jews of Warsaw, 1940-1945 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
5
Barbara Engelking & Jacek Leociak, The Warsaw Ghetto: A Guide to the Perished City (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2009), 27.
6
Paulsson, 8.
7
Michael R. Marrus, “Jewish Resistance to the Holocaust,” Journal of Contemporary History 30 (1995):
90.
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These definitions were designed to counter scholars such as Hannah Arendt and
Raul Hilberg who remarked on the lack of Jewish resistance. Arendt argued that under
the circumstances collaboration and appeasement were natural for any group of people –
despite her aversion to the practice. Furthermore, those who combated the order of things
should be revered. “The glory of the uprising in the Warsaw ghetto and the heroism of
the few others who fought back lay precisely in their having refused the comparatively
easy death the Nazis offered them – before the firing squad or in the gas chamber.” 8
Hilberg took the stance that the Jews were made docile by two millennia of
conditioning. Since the Dispersion Jews’ best hope had always lain with placation and
they were unable to change. “They avoided “provocations” and complied instantly with
decrees and orders. They hoped that somehow the German drive would spend itself…A
two-thousand-year-old lesson could not be unlearned: the Jews could not make the
switch. They were helpless.” 9 In fact, Hilberg wrote that those who resisted were a
distinct group which he called the “unadjusted.”
These definitions are both too broad and too permissive. Smuggling was often an
individual enterprise. Manufacturing was largely done in compliance with German rules
and to fill German needs, particularly those of the Wehrmacht. 10 Most importantly,
smuggling did not result in large numbers of deaths in the Nazi ranks. It was a lifesustaining operation for the Jews who undertook it for the financial benefits that accrued
to some Jews, many Poles, and law enforcement officials of all stripes.

8

Marrus, 87.
Marrus, 87-88.
10
Gutman, 93.
9
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Smuggling often did preserve life, and smugglers even referred to their decisions
in life and death terms. Jewish smugglers interviewed by Emmanuel Ringelblum at the
time of the first executions for leaving the ghetto were unfazed by the prospect of death
by firing squad. “Jewish smugglers continue to scale the Wall, because, as they put it, if
they can’t smuggle they are sentenced to death anyway.” 11
That does not change the fact that smugglers were not always moving lifesustaining items. The simple truth was that a cartload of potatoes was worth less than half
its weight in luxury goods such as fine foods, expensive clothes, quality tobacco and
alcohol. Some ghetto memoirists, Wladyslaw Szpilman for one, downplayed the black
market’s importance and indicted some of the most successful smuggling outfits. “In fact
the ghetto did not depend on smuggling to feed itself.” 12 Indeed, some of the smugglers
who moved the most merchandise were in the pay of the Gestapo and can be more
accurately labeled profiteers and collaborators than resisters.
The attempt at creating a self-sufficient Jewish community in the midst of Aryan
Warsaw failed in the face of an aggressor who would settle for nothing less than
extermination. All measures that sought to provide a living for ghetto residents came to
naught once the deportations to Treblinka began in July 1942. Nonetheless, the effort
should not be disparaged. Refusing to smuggle because it fulfilled Nazi goals is
tantamount to cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s face. It was worthwhile.

11

Sloan, 237. (22 November 1941).
Wladyslaw Szpilman, The Pianist: The Extraordinary True Story of One Man's Survival in Warsaw,
1939-1945 (New York: Picador, 2000), 13.
12
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Unfortunately, the stopgap measures could not hold out long enough for a permanent
solution.
The alternatives employed here are worthy of study as crucial examples of the
steps towards destruction. Though taken as a means of surviving, they were insufficient
for many as ghetto death tolls rose to thousands annually and the trade imbalance could
not be corrected. Smuggling was a natural result of this environment.

Chapter I
It took only eight days from the declaration of war on 1 September 1939 for the
Wehrmacht to besiege Warsaw. Although the city did not surrender until 27 September,
food and other essentials quickly became rare commodities. On 23 September newly
minted kehilla 13 chairman Adam Czerniakow noted in his diary: “There is no meat. They
started selling horsemeat, praising its taste in the newspapers, even as stock for soup.” 14
Understanding his city’s position only too well, Czerniakow ordered new business cards
printed in German. After Warsaw’s surrender 27 September, Czerniakow quickly
transitioned from heading the kehilla to the newly instated Judenrat.
Warsaw’s Jews were ordered to set up a government that would be subordinate to
the Nazi occupiers in all things. Raul Hilberg made this quite clear in his article “The
Ghetto as a Form of Government.”
German orders were unqualified and council members were required to carry
them out promptly and in full…Less stark but equally burdensome was the
necessity of asking for authorization to carry out every function of government,
including duties expected of them. 15

13

The kehilla was and remains a secular Jewish administrative body in several Eastern European countries.
It usually concerns itself with charitable and social issues. In September 1939, Czerniakow was assisting
Warsaw’s mayor by coordinating the Jewish citizens in defensive and mitigating measures. He would
receive an additional appointment to chair the Judenrat – ordered into existence by SD chief Reinhard
Heydrich – in early October.
14
Raul Hilberg, Stanislaw Staron and Josef Kermisz, ed., The Warsaw Diary of Adam Czerniakow: Prelude
to Doom (New York: Stein and Day, 1979), 76.
15
Raul Hilberg, “The Ghetto as a Form of Government” Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 450 (1980): 101.

8

Polish civilians digging defensive ditches during the siege. 16

Even with the surrender, Warsaw’s food woes were not at an end. Germanimposed controls on agricultural production together with price ceilings combined to
short the city’s native population. Hebrew language teacher and diarist Chaim A. Kaplan
blamed Nazi-imposed price controls that carried the death penalty for emptying bakers’
shelves. “Until now there was no shortage of bread. It was expensive (150 złoty a kilo),
but it was available in abundance all over…. As long as the conquerors took no notice of

16

All photos and maps are drawn from the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/gallery_ph.php?ModuleId=10005069
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this, everything went smoothly…but every time a regime, especially a despotic, foreign
regime desires our ‘good’ we find ourselves in the midst of all evil.” 17
The city as a whole resorted to smuggling to meet its caloric needs despite
Czerniakow’s bewilderment at the idea: “Could there be no black marketers where there
are no Jews?” 18 There are accounts of river smugglers moving food on passenger barges
along the Vistula River, which separated traditional Warsaw from the formerly
independent town of Praga. The smugglers were generally hired hands or other lowly
crewmembers who saw a chance for making money. They shunned bribing and those
who did it preferred to avoid German authorities. A ghetto escapee who supported herself
by working in a ship’s buffet and smuggling recounted the audacity of the river
smugglers. “This is what happened once: some stolen goods which the gendarmes
confiscated from one steamship and the Germans loaded onto ours, thinking it’d be
secure here, were stolen by the smugglers on our ship.” 19
Although the city as a whole suffered, Jews were in another situation due to
prohibitions against moving about freely, exchanging currency, appearing unmarked,
passing a German without obeisances, even receiving reliable news about the outside
world. From the beginning of the occupation, they were singled out for special edicts and
requirements. For instance, along with all their Gentile neighbors Jews had to give up
their radios in October 1939. For Christian Poles this was somewhat alleviated – at least

17

Abraham I. Katsh, ed., The Warsaw Diary of Chaim A. Kaplan (New York: Collier Books, 1973) 105.
Entry of 21 January 1940.
18
Kermisz, et al, 252.
19
Isaiah Trunk, Jewish Responses to the Holocaust: Collective and Individual Behavior in Extremis (New
York: Stein and Day, 1979) 181.
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in the realm of local news – by multiple newspapers. Jews were limited to the Naziapproved Gazeta Zydowska. 20 Also, greater opportunities for concealment and better
access to printing supplies outside the ghetto permitted the Polish underground to publish
an array of clandestine newspapers.
Understanding the theoretical application that led to an undersupplied ghetto is
essential. As Nazi Jewish policy evolved subject to its land and population policies, so
too did the character of Jewish life in captive Warsaw. There is a direct correlation
between Warsaw’s changing landscape and Jewish life in the city. Just as the Holocaust
was, in part, an outcome of the foolish extremes engendered by importing people into a
resurgent Germany to levels beyond the acceptable population index, smuggling in the
Warsaw Ghetto was the outcome of treating the General Government as a ‘racial
dumping ground’ for the displaced peoples who had made way for the imported
Volksdeutsche. Simply put, removing a highly integrated community from the social and
economic life of its home city while burdening them with tens of thousands of friendless,
stateless refugees in a freshly manufactured environment without sufficient concession
for their survival made for an atmosphere below the Germans’ orbit.
To that end physically and socially removing Jews from Aryan society was
deemed the wisest approach to a Judenfrei utopia early in the war. This is tinder to the
intentionalist-functionalist debate that dominated Holocaust scholarship in the late 20th
century. This behavior of Nazis was not without precedent and conformed to the goals of
Nazi economic warfare on subject Jews. From the earliest months of their rise to power in
20

Jewish Newspaper. This daily published for all General Government ghettoes. It ceased operations
during the onset of mass deportations to Treblinka in July 1942
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Germany, they had passed laws to rid German cultural, intellectual and economic life of
Jewish influence as well as to strip Jews of their citizenship and rights. The Law for the
Restoration of the Professional Civil Service of April 1933, the Gleischaltung 21 Laws and
the Nuremberg Race Laws of 1935 had achieved these measures in Germany itself.
Warehousing Jews was a necessary step in this process in Poland. On 21
September 1939, as the Wehrmacht, in conjunction with the Red Army, had nearly
completed the partition of Poland, Security Service (Sicherheitdienst or SD) Head
Reinhard Heydrich issued a Schnellbrief 22 to the commanders of the Einsatzgruppen der
Sicherheitspolizei 23 calling for the concentration of Jews in cities as preparation to
deportation and resettlement. Their exclusion from all phases of city life was to be a
central tenet of this plan. “Concentrations of Jews in the cities for general reasons of
security will probably bring about orders forbidding Jews from entering certain quarters
of the cities altogether, and that – in the view of economic necessity – they cannot for
instance leave the ghetto...” 24 The Schnellbrief also made provision for the formation of
Jewish councils of elders or Judenrate.
Though given a year-and-a-half-later, in a radio address of 28 March 1941 Nazi
Party philosopher and soon-to-be Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories

21

An imperfectly translated word that refers to uniformity across national life.
Quick Letter.
23
Special task forces of the Security Police. Eight special units totaling about 3,000 men attached to the
regular army groups that acted much like Soviet Commissars. They were responsible for arresting
subversive political elements, thereby protecting German soldiers, and eventually settlers, from hostile
persons and ideology.
24
Christopher Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy,
September 1939-March 1942. (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press and Yad Vashem, 2004),
111.
22
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Alfred Rosenberg publicly outlined the deportation plan. 25 “We have to think of how and
where to put the Jews. This can, as mentioned, not be done in a Jewish state, but only in a
way which I shall call the Jewish reservation…For Germany the Jewish Question is only
then solved when the last Jew has left the Greater German space.” 26
The Nazi conquerors quickly undertook to separate Jews from Poles and Germans
in the General Government generally and in Lodz, Cracow, Lwow and Warsaw
particularly. The first indication of a special path for Warsaw’s Jews was the Nazi
bilingual proclamation posted on walls around the city promising safe working conditions
and the protection of the German state. An addendum was addressed to the city’s Jews:
“they were guaranteed all their rights, the inviolability of their property and that their
lives would be absolutely secure.” 27 From the first Warsaw’s 360,000 Jews were
distinguished from their neighbors.
The Nazis were not just exporting the normal scourges of war – famine, pestilence
and death – but were inflamed with a racial mission. To give their work in Poland a legal
veneer required additional laws, at least in the Government General because it had not
been fully included in the Reich like the Incorporated Territories.
Some of the most notorious Nazi policies imposed on Warsaw’s Jews occurred
via early decrees, a favorite German method for managing Poland. Hitler made this law
12 October 1939 with his Decree on the Administration of the Occupied Polish

25

The territories extended from the Baltic states through the newly formed General Government (Central
Poland) and part of Belarus to the Ukraine.
26
Roderick Stackelberg and Sally A. Winkle, ed., The Nazi Germany Sourcebook: An Anthology of Texts
(London: Routledge, 2002), 338.
27
Szpilman, 41.
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Territories. Article V stated: “The Council of Ministers for the Defence of the Reich, the
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, and the Governor General may make laws by
means of decrees.” 28 Thereafter official decrees originated from Governor General Hans
Frank, Warsaw Governor Ludwig Fischer or Plenipotentiary for the City of Warsaw
Ludwig Leist ostracized Jews from city life. A sealed ghetto in November 1941
completed the task by eliminating them from economic life better than any banking
decree or Treuhander 29 policy could. Strict controls on the amount of necessaries
imported to a captive population stripped of its means established the framework for
smuggling and the visible culmination of Nazi goals: Jews were separated from the
market – a staple of city life – and forced to subsist on the wages of illicit trade earned at
great expense and risk.
There was also the more traditional prerogative of victors in a defeated land
personified in soldiers enforcing their decrees on the street through Jew-hunting and
degradation. The most notable official decrees include the 2,000-złoty limit on Jewish
wealth in money and goods accompanied by orders to hand over property and the order
for Jews to wear armbands decorated with a Star of David. 30
In his memoirs, world-renowned pianist Wladyslaw Szpilman recalled that the
decrees had two key effects: one malicious and the other seemingly unintended. The
malevolent aim was to remind Jews they were not forgotten. The second effect – which

28

J. Noakes & G. Pridham, ed. Nazism 1919-1945 Volume 3: Foreign Policy, War & Racial Extermination
(Exeter, Devon UK: University of Exeter Press, 1997), 927.
29
Trustee.
30
The imposition of the Star of David outwardly marking Jews in the General Government preceded the
same order in the Reich by more than a year.
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took only about two months to register – was the foundation of a contrived environment
in the form of a smuggling underworld.
Two lives began to go on side by side: an official, fictional life based on rules
which forced people to work from dawn to dusk, almost without eating, and a
second, unofficial life, full of fairy-tale opportunities to make a profit, with a
flourishing trade in dollars, diamonds, flour, leather or even forged papers – a life
lived under constant threat of the death penalty, but spent cheerfully in luxurious
restaurants to which people drove in rickshaws. 31
The Nazis took steps to separate the Jews early. In September 1939, within days of the
city’s capitulation, the Army Ost High Command blocked Jewish bank accounts and safe
deposits. Jews were limited to withdrawing 250 zloty (roughly $50) per week and holding
only 2,000 zloty (about $400) at any time. This was exacerbated in late November when
Governor General Hans Frank limited withdrawals to 500 zloty per month while
maintaining the 2,000 zloty ceiling for cash on hand. 32 January 1940 saw this currency
policy augmented once again as Jews were required to deposit all 100 and 500 zloty
notes. 33
These restrictions added to the atmosphere of general degradation and
paternalistic superiority created by other decrees. From early in the occupation Jews were
drafted for forced labor. Frank’s decree of 26 October made forced labor an official
possibility for Jewish men aged 14-60. Czerniakow noted having to supply 300 men at
the beginning of November, their wages to be paid by the Judenrat. 34 This was followed
by a decree of 23 November – perhaps the most notorious order – requiring Jews to wear

31

Szpilman, 48.
Isaiah Trunk, Judenrat: The Jewish Councils In Eastern Europe Under Nazi Occupation (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1972) 62.
33
Kermisz, et al, 109.
34
Kermisz et al, 86-87.
32
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a white armband with a blue Star of David printed on it. 35 Starting leap day 1940 Jews
had to make an obeisance to passing Germans. 36
Early December saw the introduction of laws that prohibited Jewish movement
and anticipated the establishment of a ghetto in less than a year’s time. GovernmentGeneral Higher SS and Police Leader Friedrich Krieger issued an edict that forbade Jews
from changing residence without written authorization of the German Administration
Authority. Any Jews moving into the Government General had to register their address
within twenty-four hours. A strict curfew from 9:00 PM to 5:00 AM was also introduced.
Violation carried the punishment of hard labor. 37 These restrictions were supplemented
26 January 1940 when Jews were forbidden to use railcars and 14 August when they
were refused passage on certain streets and squares – 27 total – at all times. 38 One of
these places was the former Saski Square, renamed Adolf Hitler Square on 1 September.
This was even prohibited to Jews on the forced labor battalions. 39

35

Yitzhak Arad, Israel Gutman and Abraham Margaliot, ed., Documents on the Holocaust, Selected
Sources on the Destruction of the Jews of Germany and Austria, Poland and the Soviet Union (Jerusalem:
Yad Vashem, 1981) Document No. 74. Oddly enough this order in the Government General preceded a
similar decree in Germany itself, where Jews could go unmarked, in public at least, for another year.
36
Kermisz et al, 123.
37
Arad, Gutman and Margaliot, Document No. 75.
38
Christopher Browning The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy,
September 1939-March 1942 (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2004) 138 and
Czerniakow, 184.
39
Kermisz et al, 199. Czerniakow noted that the city administrator made an important point of this during
a conversation.
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Nowy Swiat in 1900. Idyllic street that was reserved for the German Quarter.

The official impoverishment of Jews and their exclusion from professions
operated on a higher level than simply denying them basic rights to travel and operate
with currency. Reichsfuehrer SS Hermann Goering – in his capacity as Administrator of
the Four Year Program 40 – established the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost 41or HTO 1
November 1939. Frank followed his example two weeks later and set up a competing
organization. Each was empowered to take over businesses, installing a trustee or
Treuhand by Army orders from the beginning of the occupation allowing for takeovers

40

A Nazi economic initiative that was designed to put Germany on a war footing in four years’ time. It
submitted industry to a command structure and resulted in the manufacturing of inferior materials due to its
eminently corruptible administration.
41
Main Trustee Office East.
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when business owners were absent or the enterprise was inefficiently managed. This was
supplemented by an Order of 24 January 1940 “Concerning Confiscations” permitting
acquisitions “if this is in the public interest.” 42
Legalized theft was also encouraged by Frank’s decree of 24 January 1940 that
Jews must register their property. If it was not registered quickly it was considered
ownerless and could be confiscated. Any enterprise counting even a few Jews among the
owning partners was subject to this qualification. 43 The expropriation reached its peak on
17 September 1940, when Goering issued the order “Concerning the Treatment of
Property of the Citizens of the Former Polish State.” Now all Jewish property was subject
to seizure except for personal belongings and 1,000 marks cash. 44
The denouement to this policy trajectory occurred on 16 November 1940 – the
first day of the ghetto’s sequestered existence – as 1,170 Jewish groceries and 2,600 other
Jewish shops – those that had evaded the Treuhander – were placed beyond the reach of
their proprietors permanently. 45 Similarly, the accumulated possessions of lifetimes and
the personal dwellings families had invested in were no longer theirs. Jewish Policeman
Stanislaw Adler remarked in his diary:
For many scores of thousands of Jews, transfer to the ghetto meant complete
material ruin. There were relatively few who could exchange their apartments
with Aryans who had been living in the area that was to be the Jewish Quarter.

42

Trunk, Judenrat 62-63.
Trunk, Judenrat 63-64.
44
Israel Gutman The Jews of Warsaw, 1939-1940: Ghetto, Underground, Revolt (Bloomington, Indiana:
Indiana University Press, 1982) 72 & Trunk, 64.
45
Kermisz et al, 222.
43
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These exchanges, due to a greater demand for homes in the Quarter, were
conducted with a much greater burden on the Jewish contracting parties. 46

46

Stanislaw Adler, In the Warsaw Ghetto 1940-1943. An Account of a Witness (Jerusalem, Yad Vashem,
1982), 33.

CHAPTER II
The first decree to be circumvented in the return to a normal life and departure to
fantastic prospects for revenue was the bread order. As per an early decree, buying or
selling bread – by Jews or Christians – at greater than prewar prices carried death by
firing squad. Szpilman and his family were terrified for days and replaced bread with
other carbohydrates. They soon realized that bread was still available for purchase and no
one was dying in transactions. Indeed, he noted that had the Germans actively enforced
this order, which was never cancelled, “millions of death sentences must have been
incurred in the General Government area of German-ruled Polish territory for this offence
alone.” 47
About the same time Warsaw – Christian, Jewish and refugee – was awakening to
the possibility of normal, possibly rich, life, the SS and Gestapo were attempting to make
Jewish seclusion official. The early days of November 1939 saw the first step toward
ghettoization. While this attempt largely failed when a Wehrmacht general overruled
Warsaw’s SS commander, the city’s traditionally Jewish quarter became an open
quarantine where Germans were forbidden to live in the interests of public health.
However, Poles and Volksdeutsche were allowed to remain in the section. Jews were still
allowed to travel outside this district for work although their right to change residences
without permission was forbidden. 48
Emanuel Ringelblum saw the quarantine area for what it was, a sentence of
ghettoization and imprisonment. “Gradually, a ghetto is being established. All telegrams
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have to be dispatched through the Jewish Council; they handle train tickets, too.” 49 There
was no mistaking the Nazi maneuver. They had formed a figurative ghetto to separate
Jews from their Polish neighbors and German masters, placing them beyond association.
Now the Jews were beyond reach. Hebrew language teacher and diarist Chaim Kaplan
also refused to be hoodwinked. “Nazism wants to separate everyone – lords by
themselves, the underlings by themselves, the slaves by themselves. The blessed and the
accursed must not mingle.” 50
A ghetto was inevitable. Heydrich’s Schnellbrief from the invasion made that
clear. In true Nazi administrative fashion, however, the details had to be worked out.
Heydrich had allowed leeway for the needs of the Army or the prerogative of local
administrators. “Obviously the tasks at hand cannot be laid down in detail from here.” 51
Thus, Łodz experienced life in a sealed ghetto from 30 April 1940 while Warsaw’s Jews
were free to walk and work until 15 November due to the caprices which governed their
separate administrations. In keeping with Nazi policies of economic warfare, Jews were
held responsible for the cost of their imprisonment. The wall that surrounded them was
built by Jewish labor under the supervision of German contractors paid by funds exacted
via the Judenrat. 52
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On the second day of the occupation, the Nazis ordered a census of the city’s
Jews. It found that 359,827 of the city’s 1.6 million residents were Jews. 173,000 were
actively employed and of those, 95,000 worked in industry, crafts, commerce, teaching or
the professions. In little more than a year those people were no longer employed at their
chosen professions while half the nation’s artisans were separated from their trades.
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The first attempt at ghettoization was in November 1939. Then SS officials tried
to use the city military commander’s name – General Heinz von Neumann-Neurode – to
force Warsaw’s Jews into a ghetto in three days. Once von Neumann-Neurode realized
what had been attempted without his consent, he told the Judenrat to ignore the order. 54
His magnanimity is probably attributable most to the infighting and power struggles that
routinely characterized Nazi Government, the army being no exception to that imbroglio.
This confused aspect of Nazi administration was fueled by a leadership tactic, used at the
very top of the hierarchy, of giving similar orders to several people or organizations who
then tried to outdo each other in a quest for more power. 55
In late November 1939 the largest Jewish neighborhood was declared a
quarantine area or Seuchengebiet. A Jewish curfew from 9 p.m. to 5 a.m. was
implemented, and simultaneously Nazis ordered barbed wire erected on streets leading
into the area with signs warning German soldiers their passage was forbidden due to the
risk of typhus (Seuchen). Interestingly, this barrier expressly curtailed the movements of
only Germans. Jews, Poles and ethnically German volksdeutsche still had free run of the
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city. This theme of German limitation pervades the period and was a factor in forming
German behavior.

Entrance to the ghetto with warning sign reading ‘Quarantine Area: Only Through Traffic is Permitted.’

Although the quarantine area was created it could not compare to the disaster a
speedily arranged ghetto would have been. Even assuming this ghetto conformed to the
borders of the eventual one, about 150,000 people would have had to move. 56 More
businesses, social institutions and houses of worship would have been disturbed than
were eventually since those had yet to be intruded upon.
Starting in December Jews were further segregated apart by a marking decree,
before Germany had one. All Jews older than twelve had to wear a blue Star of David on
a white armband. Jewish businesses also had to be labeled. Ghetto diarists often noted the
jokes current in the ghetto. Czerniakow included this one a few months after the marking
56
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decree: “A Jew wearing an armband is addressed by a stranger: ‘General, Sir.’ ‘But I am
not a general.’ ‘Yes you are, there is your star.’” 57 The demand for a previously
unneeded clothing item created a business. Czerniakow called it the Jewish Community’s
first. 58

Selling armbands 19 September 1941.

Definite limits on Jewish movement and habitation came with the New Year. In
January 1940 Jews were forbidden to change address without permission and Jews
moving into the city could only reside in the quarantine area. Nazis also instituted laws to
separate Jews from each other. Their intent was to destroy Jewish communal, cultural and
57
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spiritual life. The most egregious of these was the January closure of synagogues coupled
with a ban on group prayer in private homes. Ironically, the ban was lifted 15 October
1940, just after the ghetto was announced and at the end of Yom Kippur, 5701.
Synagogues remained closed and the private worshippers were warned not to crowd or
make too much noise so there was a great deal of leeway for guards to interpret whether a
gathering was illegal.
These measures reflect those which in Germany created what Christopher
Browning called substitute ghettoization. There, Jews were required to leave homes near
the western border, concentrate in Jewish-only homes in the cities where they settled and
finally to reside in specific districts. In Germany they balked at policies that would
induce mass homelessness and thereby cause too great a shock to the order of things. 59
The General Government embraced such changes. In late 1940, Kaplan called Frank:
“this tyrant whose wickedness and cruelty are even greater than that of the Führer.” 60
In Germany proper anti-Jewish measures had been the fruit of years of Nazi rule
and gradual implementation sometimes with the veneer of legality – as in 1935’s
Nuremberg Race Laws – and with occasional abatements – as during the 1936 Olympics.
The General Government was playing catch up and surpass. This was partially a product
of the guidelines Germany followed as they fought eastward.
The first goal of the Wehrmacht was to redraw Europe’s map. During a 6 October
1939 speech to the Reichstag, Chancellor Adolf Hitler enumerated goals including “a
Reich boundary that does justice to historical, ethnographic and economic conditions”
59
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and “the main task is to create a new ethnographic order; i.e., to resettle the nationalities
so that in the end, better lines of demarcation exist than is today the case.” 61 Key to this
reorganization was economic rationalization – Polish being synonymous with
mismanaged in Nazi parlance – and resettlement. The resettlement would include
reducing Poland (the portions not annexed into the Reich or given to Axis allies) to 15
million “ethnics” and two million Jews. 62
Reichsfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler added Reich Commissioner for the
Consolidation of German Nationhood, or RKF, to his titles and undertook to oversee the
redistribution of tens of thousands of people. Under the guise of generosity and resolving
international problems, Hitler and his closest circle made deals to repatriate people of
German ancestry. The Pact of Steel with Italy and the Molotov-von Ribbentrop nonaggression pact with Soviet Russia – both signed in 1939 – contained provisions
requiring that 500,000 Germans be evacuated from the South Tyrol and along the Soviet
edge of the Reich from Estonia to the Black Sea before 1941.
Relocating people is no mean feat and not easily accomplished even if the people
in charge of it – Himmler, Heydrich and Adolf Eichmann – later proved so adept at it.
During this practice run, they were not quite as successful as in their subsequent efforts.
To begin, they were trading at a surplus. Fewer Russian or Italian nationals were
returning. Also, Himmler and his lot did not have the luxury of writing off percentages of
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their transports since they actually intended to set these people up in a livable situation.
Many of the repatriates had to live in displaced persons camps.
Poland was the solution to this housing crisis. Germans already believed the Poles
were not producing enough from their land because of successive partition and Germany
needed living space. Once Poland was partitioned there was an opportunity to give land
to all these people plus the additional Rhine farmers who were going to be displaced for
military necessity at the cost of only Poles and Polish Jews.
Heydrich’s Schnellbrief was a product of this policy. The annexation of Poland’s
western chunk as the Reich’s Incorporated Eastern Territories was also. The deportation
of the native population, whatever their ethnicity, was its short-range end.
The deportees went to the General Government in such droves that Frank referred
to his fiefdom as Europe’s “dumping ground.” In Warsaw, 90,000 Jewish refugees
arrived in groups of thousands before the Jewish district was created. Jews forced to
leave smaller shtetls and villages in the countryside, per Heydrich’s Schnellbrief
augmented the new arrivals until one-third of Warsaw’s Jews were refugees.
They encountered a city increasingly off-limits, where even their coreligionists
and fellows might not welcome them. Once the ghetto was formed refugees were
friendless – leaving them liable to be at the top of deportation lists – and without acquired
immunities from a life of city dwelling – exposing them to greater risk of infection from
the illnesses sweeping the ghetto. Ringelblum sympathized with the exiles.
Frank described his mission in his diary: “On 15 September 1939, I received
orders to take over the administration of the conquered eastern territories with an order to
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exploit the territory particularly as a theater of war and conquered country, making it, if I
might say so, a heap of rubble from the point of view of its economic, social, cultural and
political structure.” 63 Hitler empowered Frank with virtually unlimited authority by a
decree of 27 September 1939. This was another factor in the radicalization. 64
February 1940 saw the General Government continuing to emulate Germany’s
domestic example. Jews were limited to shopping in only Jewish-owned businesses.
Ration cards were also differentiated in February. Jewish cards bore the Star of David,
Polish cards were pink and Germans’ were blue. In March, cafés and restaurants put up
signs banning Jewish entry.
February was also the time for limiting the Jewish use of transportation. First,
Jews were not permitted to share the rails anywhere in the General Government. In a few
months clearly labeled Jewish-only tram cars were introduced. Three tramlines explicitly
for Jewish use eventually replaced them.
All the while, Nazi administrators were planning a ghetto. The planning took
place in the Warsaw District’s Office of Resettlement under its director Waldemar Schön.
The military government’s abortive attempt was followed by plans to concentrate
Warsaw’s Jews in Praga across the Vistula River in February 1940. The following April,
as the ghetto in Lodz was sealed, two Warsaw ghettos were pondered.
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It was during April 1940 that separation and ghettoization began in Warsaw.
Construction began on a wall that would redefine the landscape and make painfully clear
the sonderweg 65 of Polish Jews. The Judenrat oversaw the construction – under orders
from the district government – around the quarantine area. In June, when the wall was
finished, signs adorned it cautioning about the potential for epidemic.

Polish civilians pass by the wall 1940 or 1941.

Still, a ghetto was not yet official policy, and one must pay close attention to the
subsequent steps taken over the next few months. In August, Leist decreed new districts
for the city’s main ethnic groups, in keeping with Hitler’s stated objectives for Poland.
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Again, Germans were the ones most limited – or at least set apart – by their own efforts.
Poles and Jews could and did continue to live and operate businesses in each other’s
districts. Poles could remain in the proposed German area. Jewish refugees now moving
into the city had to take up in the quarantine area. Germans could not settle on their own
area even though they were given the nicest parts of town. In fact, it was not until the end
of their occupation that Germans coalesced into a single community within Warsaw, and
then it was more a measure of mutual protection as the General Uprising occurred and the
Red Army neared the city.
Also in August and September, Jews were given new bounds they could never
traverse for any reason. Twenty-seven streets – home to about 1,800 Jews – became offlimits. On 1 September Saski Square, abutting the quarantine area for the space of several
blocks on its western edge with the dividing line at Marszalkowska Street, was renamed
Adolf Hitler Square and forbidden to Jews.
Just before the ghetto was announced the Jewish curfew was revised to hold them
in their homes from 7 p.m. to 8 a.m. on 6 October 1940. The ghetto was announced by
loudspeaker 12 October. Initially, Warsaw’s Jews outside the quarantine area had only
until the end of October to make the move. Complications made an extension necessary.

CHAPTER III
This latest Jewish District would only be an abode for Jews. Some diarists
actually expressed sorrow for the Polish shopkeepers whose businesses would lose all
value since they were included in the ghetto where the residents were being intentionally
impoverished. 66 The initial plan to conform to the borders of the quarantine area was
discarded soon since Poles effectively lobbied to retain areas based on church or school
locations, the makeup of a neighborhood or a major business concern. The complaints
angered many Jewish observers, even ones who had previously been sympathetic to the
displaced Poles.
Ringelblum was one who consistently gave credit to his Polish neighbors unlike
some who expressed only bitterness. His condemnation of the tactics some used to secure
more of their city for their kind rings all the more true because of Ringelblum’s past
kindness. “The Poles are up to all kinds of tricks to increase the number of houses in the
Polish quarter. For example, they wall up the gates of houses facing on Jewish
neighborhoods; the gates facing Polish neighborhoods of the very same houses are left
open.” 67 Kaplan concurred. “The Polish side began to haggle…Thus they excised piece
after piece, street after street, of the Jewish area, and the boundaries grew more and more
constricted.” 68 The frustration is understandable considering the great chunks subtracted
from the quarantine area, up to several blocks in some places.
Between Leist’s announcement and 15 November, Jews and Poles rushed to trade
apartments. 138,000 Jews and 113,000 Poles were displaced in the resettlement.
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Ringelblum remarked: “The city is placarded with white cards advertising apartments for
exchange between Jews and Christians. The whole wall near the apartment office of the
Jewish Council is white.” 69
Although Germans forbade anyone to call the new district a ghetto, Jews called it
such. What they did not expect was a sealed ghetto. Jews, Poles and many Germans
anticipated a ghetto on the Venice model. Venetians founded the original ghetto on an
iron foundry – or getto –in 1516. In this and other walled Jewish wards, gates were closed
at night but communication was allowed otherwise. Varsovians assumed the same with
gates remaining shut during the newly inflated Jewish curfew.
At the prospect of an open ghetto, Warsaw’s Jews expressed a general sang-froid.
They had experienced too many turns and loss of liberties to be surprised about another
limitation. There was even an effort to find reasons for welcoming the ghetto, either as an
endpoint of decrees or at least as a place where Jews would be alone. Pessimism and an
understanding of German promises tainted these ideas. Kaplan wrote:
When the ghetto was established, we thought we would have things a little easier.
After all, this is an infested place in their eyes, and a Nazi would hesitate to risk
his life. But here again we were mistaken. There is no more likely place for
robberies and murders in broad daylight than the ghetto. Here there is no seeing
eye, or listening ear. The Aryans [Poles] have left, and the Nazis are not ashamed
before Jews, who are not considered human. 70
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The ghetto’s nearly 400,000 residents woke 16 November to a ghetto unlike what
they had presumed. They were closed in, and only 53,000 bearers of permits for essential
war work could cross the boundaries without punishment. 71
The Saturday the Ghetto was introduced…was terrible. People in the street didn’t
know it was to be a closed ghetto, so it came like a thunderbolt. Details of
German, Polish, and Jewish guards stood at every street corner searching passersby to decide whether or not they had the right to pass. Jewish women found the
markets outside the ghetto closed to them. There was an immediate shortage of
bread and other produce. There’s been a real orgy of high prices ever since. There
are long queues in front of every food store, and everything is being bought up.
Many items have suddenly disappeared from the shops. 72

The imprisoned had to make do with only the resources 425 acres (only 325 residential)
of built-up land containing 1,483 houses offered. 73 There were initially 22 entry points in
11 miles of 10 foot high walls topped with barbed wire and broken glass guarded by a
force of 87 German policeman – augmented by usually one Pole and one Jewish Order
Policeman per gate – under the command of a First Lieutenant. 74 All told, 30 percent of
Warsaw’s population was living on 2.4 percent of its territory at eight times the rest of
the city’s density, more than 200,000 people per square mile. Warsaw had 1,800 streets.
Only 73 were included and hardly any of those in their entirety. 75
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Jewish Police at a barricade February 1941.

The establishment of the Transferstelle in December further complicated the
Jewish plight. Goods going either way underwent a customs process similar to that for
trade between nations. The organization head, Alexander Palfinger, was extremely hostile
toward Jewish life and insisted on curbing food shipments into the ghetto. He believed
the population should be bled of hidden wealth before regular trade commenced. In his
opinion, Jews had intentionally and very effectively disobeyed the October 1939 banking
decree. This outlook motivated the orders that forbade Jews from moving furniture into
the ghetto, a largely ignored law. Palfnger’s superior, Schön of the Resettlement Office,
described his mission as the “effective and continuous exploitation of the labor and
economic potential of the Jews for maintaining the Jewish District until the complete
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liquidation of Jewish property at the time of the evacuation to Madagascar.” 76 This was
certainly in the same spirit as Frank’s understanding of his orders with the simple
removal of all Poles besides Jews.
The first phase of Nazi economic warfare against Warsaw’s Jews was
consummated with the sealing of the ghetto. By all appearances, the Jews were unable to
provide for themselves and a natural, sharp decrease should have ensued. However, while
many died, the ghetto inhabitants proved canny and resourceful and surprised their
captors. In a year’s time Frank would note in a Berlin speech that he had encountered the
strangest phenomena in the Government-General: Jews who worked.
But these Jews are not that parasite gang alone, from our point of view, but
strangely enough – we only realized it over there – there is another category of
Jews, something one would never have thought possible. There are laboring Jews
over there who work in transport, in building, in factories, and others are skilled
workers such as tailors, shoemakers, etc. 77
Frank’s revelation did not have much effect. In a speech to SS officers in Posen 4
October 1943, Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler rejected the sentiment. “It is one of
those things that is easily said – ‘the Jewish people are being eradicated’…and then they
all come, the 80 million upright Germans, and each one has his decent Jew. Of course,
the others are pigs, but this one is a first-class Jew.” 78
The ‘change’ Frank noticed was a result of Warsaw’s Jews being kept on
starvation rations inside the ghetto due to the Transferstelle’s intransigence on its
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attritionist stance. Attritionists were based in Warsaw and advocated punishing Jews by
extracting absolutely all their wealth and reducing them to the grade of serfs until they
could be deported. They were opposed by productionists from the Government General’s
capital Cracow. Under the influence of economists, productionists felt that preventing the
Jews from being a burden on the Nazi state until deportation was most important. To that
end, productionists wanted to prevent the ghetto from being a money pit. Conversely,
they wanted it to produce – if not a profit at least enough for the Jews to pay for their own
imprisonment. Clearly, neither side bore great love for Jews, although the attritionists
proved a little more prophetic as to how policy would ultimately turn out.
The difference of opinion stemmed from a March 1941 report of the Reich Board
for Economic Efficiency. The Board’s quandary was a product of the Nazi goal of
excluding Jews from economic life, according to Party Doctrine not just a trade and
industry consideration but also a public health imperative. Recall the words of the 1920
German Worker’s Party Platform: “The Party…combats the Jewish-materialistic spirit
within us and around us, and is convinced that a lasting recovery of our nation can only
succeed from within on the principle: The General interest before self-interest.” 79
The rub lay in the fact that an overcrowded, sealed ghetto whose inhabitants were
forbidden any but the most demeaning labor outside the walls would necessarily consume
much more than it produced. The report concluded that Jews would have to be employed
in production to support their own existence. At a meeting 3 April 1941 Dr. Walter
Emmerich of the Economic Division of the General Government phrased it so: “In all
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economic reflections regarding the ghetto, one must free oneself from the notion that it is
still going well in the ghetto and that supplies are still available there…The starting point
for all economic measures has to be the idea of maintaining the capacity of the Jews to
live.” 80
On 7 April 1941 Schön had berated his productionist colleagues for thinking that
a Jew needed food similar to a human. “A work animal from whom a human being
demands output was never the subject of profound contemplation concerning its needs.
On the contrary…the one who maintains the animal regulates its food supply according
to its productivity.” 81 For Schön, that productivity was wrapped up in bleeding the ghetto
inhabitants’ assets, not just extracting useful labor from them. In his estimation there was
plenty of hidden wealth to feed the ghetto for up to six months.
In January 1941 the 380,740 people in the ghetto were entitled by their ration
cards to subsist on a quarter pound of bread daily, one egg and two pounds of jam
monthly. 82 Separate statistical studies from the ghetto period reach different conclusions
about the caloric intake of Warsaw’s population; however, they all point to distribution
inequities. A 1941 Polish study found that Germans received 2,613 calories daily, Poles
699 and Jews 184. A secret ghetto survey reported consumption across professional, class
and residency lines. It found that Judenrat officials consumed 1,665 calories per day,
unemployed intelligentsia 1,395, independent craftsmen 1,407, shop employees 1,229,
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wholesale merchants 1,429, street merchants 1,277, waggoners and rickshaw drivers
1,544, doormen 1,300, refugees 807 and beggars 784 for an average of 1,125 calories. 83
It did not take long for Schön and his fellow attritionists (a term Christopher
Browning coined for them) to cut off food shipments to the ghetto. They were confident
Jews had enough wealth to get by for a few months and it was their duty to facilitate its
removal. 84 December 1940 saw 15,000 quarts of milk consumed daily in the city. Each
German child was entitled to three-fourths of a quart. Only Germans could buy citrus
fruits and any available meat. Poles were limited to purchasing other fruits at elevated
prices, some meats and green vegetables. The Jews, enduring their first month in a sealed
ghetto, suffered from the official importation of only oats, grains, beets, carrots and
turnips. 85
Palfinger – who had formerly worked in the Lodz ghetto – had been appointed to
run Warsaw’s Transferstelle at its inception in December 1940. His office was at the
center of the controversy. Its job was to regulate the flow of any goods – including food
and medical supplies – or raw materials into the ghetto, set prices for the sale of finished
goods and oversee their transfer out. It was the sole arbiter in all financial transactions
and the price levels. So far Palfinger and his fellow attritionists had used their authority to
attempt the starvation of Warsaw’s Jews.
From their point of view, the ghetto’s population still possessed a massive amount
of wealth and it was the German duty to hemorrhage those resources. Indeed, the
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Government General’s Medical Officer Wilhelm Hagen, in response to an appeal that
milk be provided to infants was bewildered. “How dare the Jews make such a proposal
when they can satisfy all their needs with contraband?” 86
This initial period of the Transferstelle’s rule (December 1939-April 1940) is the
first clear instance of smuggling serving to affirm Nazi doctrine and interests. Palfinger,
Schön and the other attritionists expected that Jews had not conformed to the previous
decree ordering the surrender of their wealth greater than 2,000 zloty. Smuggling, in their
view, corroborated the image of the Jewish shyster elaborated a few weeks earlier by
Rosenberg: “It (the Jewish Question) is still an economic problem for all those who
cannot solve their social questions under the Jewish financial dictatorship. It is a political
problem of power, because in many states the will has not yet been found to break this
financial dictatorship of Jewry.” 87
This confirmation of a stereotype is very similar to the irony of public health in
the ghetto. Population density in the ghetto was 200,000 people per square mile. 88
Combined with an enforced food shortage and scarce medical or sanitation provision –
corpses frequently lay on sidewalks for days wrapped in newspaper awaiting pickup –
these policies meant that disease was bound to spread. In an attempt at securing greater
amounts of food some ghetto residents would conceal corpses and not report the death. If
the death was unknown the decedent was still entitled to their rations, thus enabling their
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friends or family to get extra food. 89 In the ghetto’s case, typhus spread by lice was the
most rampant illness. 90
Productionists ran the ghetto for a brief period. Their ideas temporarily took
precedence and their advocates became ghetto officials. Crucial to the productionists’
victory was the 15 May 1941 appointment of Max Bischof to the administration of the
Transferstelle with instructions to make the ghetto self-sufficient. 91 His tool to achieve
that end was liberating the Transferstelle from its close association with the Judenrat and
thereby an attempt at commanding the ghetto’s entire economy. There was some
remarkable turnaround under this administration. Income from legally produced goods
from the ghetto in June 1941 only totaled 300,000 zloty. By November, it had increased
to 1.2 million zloty. 92
Although there was ghetto manufacturing almost none of it was cottage industry
of the variety that would empower individuals to subsist by this method, no matter how
demeaning it may be. As forced laborers, Jews had supported the German war effort
since the beginning of the Nazi occupation. The first forced labor battalions dug ditches,
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paved roads and otherwise enabled the war machine. Now that the ghetto was in place
Jewish manufacturers became preferred producers for the Wehrmacht. In Adler’s words:
“As a rule, Jewish industry operated clandestinely and therefore avoided any
planning…to its great fortune, the masses of German troops were in urgent need of
various supplies and equipment. Thus with the help of the German authorities there
sprouted up plans to manufacture brushes, mattresses, beds, clothing, furs, shoes.” 93
Historian Josef Kermisz pointed out the strength of the trade as an extra tie
between Aryan Poles and their former Jewish neighbors. “Jewish manufacturers and
artisans obtained raw materials illegally, having them smuggled from the Aryan side. The
contact of the Ghetto with the outside world was so extensive that various raw materials,
which would appear from time to time at the Aryan side, were directly transmitted to the
Ghetto to be processed there.” 94
This wealth of finished goods was doubly illegal since their raw materials avoided
the Transferstelle and the Army trucks or professional smugglers that took delivery
entered and exited by separate gates with special passes or simple bribes. The draw for
the Wehrmacht was cheaper prices, fewer fees and almost no middlemen.
The army deliberately circumvented the civilian administration of the General
Government to avoid the high duties normally paid to the transferring office.
Moreover, the army, anxious for the prompt delivery of desperately needed
material, was willing to buy directly from Jewish manufacturers, even when it
meant paying higher prices, in order to avoid German manufacturers and the
middlemen who were inclined to pocket some of the profits.” 95
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The export value of this illegal manufacture was tallied by the underground
archives, through one of their secret surveys, for five months in 1941 at 10 million zloty
or 3.5 times greater than its legal counterpart. 96 This is the same period when Judenrat
Chairman Adam Czerniakow stated that legal food importation accounted for 1.8 million
zloty monthly, while illegal imports ran up to between 70 and 80 million zloty. 97
The productionist takeover was welcomed as a switch to reasonable authority.
Bischof’s superior, Commissioner of the Jewish District Heinz Auerswald, was “a man
the Jews thought at first was a friend of theirs and an honest man.” 98 Czerniakow recalled
the assurances Auerswald first made him 13 May 1941: “his attitude to the Council was
objective and matter of fact, without animosity.” 99 Despite pledges offered by the new
administration, ghetto policy hardly changed and the attritionists continued to have their
say. In the month following Czerniakow’s first meeting with Bischof and Auerswald, he
detailed a new administration bent on titles and the outward appearance of change –
factors that would reduce Czerniakow’s credibility in the ghetto – even though they
changed their rhetoric in regard to Jews. In less than a month, it was apparent that
Palfinger still had important influence and Nazi authorities would rather see smuggling
than open Jewish-Aryan relations.
To Czerniakow’s proposal, made 3 June 1941, that starvation in the ghetto be
eased by purchasing “potatoes, etc.” on the free market – an effort that would reduce
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smuggling Czerniakow included in his pitch – Bischof agreed in principle. Then he asked
for the opinion of Palfinger, who happened to be present. Palfinger replied that it would
be an “insult to authority.” Bischof then turned down the proposal. 100 Czerniakow learned
a few days later what Auerswald and Bischof had been considering since before they took
office. In spite of the unchecked spread of disease, illicit trade was to be tolerated. “He
(Auerswald) indicated that so far as smuggling is concerned the authorities are looking
the other way but that they will take the sternest measures against people leaving the
ghetto. The reason – the epidemic.” 101 Bischof and Auerswald were tacitly approving
smuggling so long as Germans and Poles did all the moving outside the ghetto.
Regardless of the productionists’ victory in the dispute over how to manage the
Warsaw ghetto, the status quo enacted by attritionists remained the norm. The only
difference was that the new Nazi ghetto administrators viewed smuggling in a different
light. It was no longer a means by which Jews would be absolutely impoverished through
the bleeding of their goods but a method of reinvigorating the ghetto’s economy so Jews
would cease to be a burden on the Nazi state until deportations could be carried out.
Smuggling could also be argued to have served Nazis and their accomplices most
directly when it financially benefited them. With the establishment of the Transferstelle
in the month following the closing of the ghetto, any goods brought to the ghetto without
first Palfinger’s and later Bischof’s approval were necessarily contraband. This meant
that not just goods snuck through holes in the wall or over the wall by means of ladders
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were illegal. Anything that passed the gates unofficially was illegal. These were routes
some very organized smugglers used.

CHAPTER IV
At the point where a physical barrier had reinforced the social ones constructed
between Jews, Poles and Germans this paper advances its focus. Before, understanding
landscape changes in the light of larger German policies was key. From now on,
interpreting the landscape of smuggling, physical and abstract is the rule. This is
especially important for comprehending illicit trade, as smugglers were beholden to the
geography for their occupation and the new dictates of their exchanges – social,
professional and otherwise.
Cut off from their city and their livelihoods, struggling to subsist, Warsaw’s Jews
impressed and evaded their captors. Jews managed to find new sources of raw materials
and new outlets for finished goods. Specialists whose training was not so practical found
other ways to make a living. All the while a trade imbalance persisted that made all these
alternatives stopgap measures.
Not everyone, however, was an artisan or fortunate enough to get a job
manufacturing, and they too had been impoverished, cut off from their livelihoods. Still,
there were new demands to be met and services that started to meet those needs. Ghetto
inmate Henryk Brysker remarked in his journal: “People who were engineers yesterday
are happy to get a job as a doorman today; a lawyer – a peddler of candies…a lawyer – a
prison guard; and a street peddler who stuck with his vocation – that is the gallery of the
reshuffled classes.” 102
The Jewish Self-Aid Society (JSS) estimated in December 1941 that 65,000 of the
ghetto’s residents were employed, most in salaried positions. The penniless numbered
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more than 200,000. 103 The remaining 100,000-150,000 fell somewhere in between and
were usually petty traders or just people selling their last possessions off.
Exploiting Jewish labor had long been Government-General policy. From the
earliest days of the occupation Jews had been drafted into labor battalions. That
continued in the sealed ghetto. In its 21 July 1941 issue Gazeta Zydowska encouraged the
use of labor as the last factor of production left to Jews. “The Jewish Quarter of Warsaw
lacks raw materials, sufficient capital, and significant industry. The only means at its
disposal is labor. If labor is properly exploited, it can serve as the sole means of export
capable of balancing import.” 104
To outward appearances this seems to have been an accepted idea. The Judenrat
unofficially allowed the affluent to bribe their way out of work details. That money was
then used to pay the poor who went with the outfits. 105 Ringelblum noted the
determination the poor exhibited to work outside the walls. He recorded that it took
beatings, gun shots, severe woundings and an occasional death to ward off the mobs who
tried to board trucks at 103 Plaza Zelazna during shift changes for robota 106 work outside
the ghetto. “But why do they mob the truck? The answer is simple. People working
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outside the Ghetto are given two good soups and half a kilo of bread a day. That’s the
reason for the mob.” 107
However, others do not accept the idea that cheap Jewish labor was the only
choice. Ghetto survivor and scholar Israel Gutman downplayed attempts to exploit Jewish
skilled labor in the ghetto for meager wages and extra soup allotments. Gutman’s point is
well made and carries to a greater conclusion but does not account for the needs of the
unskilled or those whose skills did not fit into the production mould.
The Transferstelle under its earlier attritionist management was not going to allow
sufficient food into the ghetto. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC
or the Joint) and the Commission for Polish Relief (CPR) were hamstrung by
bureaucratic red tape to such a degree that they were unable to import necessities with
any consistency.
The Joint was concerned with the inability of the British Admiralty and German
occupation authorities to reach an agreement about aid for conquered peoples. The
British Navy would not allow ships through their blockade without supervisors to assure
the food would go to needy Poles. Germany refused the concession and the Joint
eventually gave up any additional attempts because each scheme for importing essentials
into Poland would likely end up materially benefiting Germany. 108 Aside from 7,000 cans
of Nestle milk sent to the ghetto in 1941, the Joint was unable to accomplish its mission.
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The CPR, which was modeled on Herbert Hoover’s post-World War I relief
organizations, had some successes but was ultimately forced to shutter its Polish
operation. In June 1940 the CPR sent 540,000 pounds of evaporated milk and 1.26
million pounds of rye flour to distribution centers in Poland. An accompanying official
personally witnessed that about 25 percent of the food went to Jewish children. 109
The simplest method of help had problems of its own. Initially parcels were
delivered through the postal service to Jews in the Warsaw ghetto. The ghetto post office
delivered 113,006 parcels in June 1941.110 Particularly fortunate in this case were
Americans. Diarist Mary Berg’s mother was an American and regularly received
packages. “Once a month, all American citizens receive a large package of foodstuffs for
the sum of eleven zlotys – but its real value is three hundred, and it often contains articles
that are unobtainable elsewhere at any price whatsoever.” 111
Eventually the parcels proved too tempting and were seized if they weighed too
much or if Jews received too many. “During September [1941], 15,000 parcels, with an
estimated value of several million zloty, were requisitioned. They requisition parcels over
6 pounds if they contain leather, flour, fats; under 4 pounds if there are several parcels for
one addressee.” The packages’ contents were initially redistributed through a grocery
store and finally given directly to an Order Police Battalion. 112
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The worst irony of the failure of outside organizations to provide for the ghetto
was that the Jews of Warsaw had a tradition of charity, and organizations existed that
were capable of effectively distributing what aid arrived. Those certainly made the best of
what they had in mitigating the deadly factors and providing for the orphaned,
dispossessed, ill and indigent. One example is the JSS, a branch of the Judenrat that ran
soup kitchens. August 1941 saw 140,000 meals provided daily by the JSS. 113 Henryk
Goldszmit – better remembered by his penname Janusz Korczak was an author, educator
and founder of an orphanage who is remembered as bravely accompanying his charges to
Treblinka and death even though he had been offered escape. He portrayed the dwindling
generosity of ghetto inmates thus: “At first you gave willingly, then without enthusiasm;
first from a sense of duty, then according to the law of inertia, by force of habit and
without feeling; and then, finally, unwillingly, with anger in despair.” 114
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1940-41 The sign at top left announces “Soup in the courtyard, first floor, apt. 47.”

An incident involving Czerniakow, whose economic policies were described as
“liberal” and “laissez-faire,” also serves to illustrate the point well. 115 Calling upon a
wealthy man who had recently spent 4,000 zloty in one of the ghetto’s more extravagant
locations, Czerniakow tried to get a donation for the charities the Judenrat participated in
or administered. The man offered 15 zlotys. Czerniakow responded by saying, “You will
give not 15, but 25, and not in zlotys but in thousands of zlotys,” and had the man jailed.
He would only release him upon payment of 10,000 zlotys with a pledge for 15,000
more. 116
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CHAPTER V
Chaim Kaplan’s worries about Germans committing crimes in the seclusion of the
ghetto aside, Germans gravitated toward their guard posts. With the exception of citywide
trams that carried Poles and Germans in transit at top speed under police escort through
the ghetto, non-Jews did not see the inside of the ghetto. Everyone needed a pass to get in
and sources indicate those were not forthcoming. Total isolation was a fact.
Tram service had been interrupted for the city during the German siege when 80
percent of the electric track was destroyed. Then eccentric transportation methods
cropped up. The ghetto had similar transportation developments. 117 Jews in the ghetto
period were limited to three special tram lines that ran only in the ghetto. Some measures
reduced their ability to use even this limited service. From 30 October 1940 Jews had to
purchase a five-zloty card monthly for the right to buy tram tickets. Without it a ticket
cost a Jew four times regular price. 118
Jews had brief encounters with their Polish neighbors after ghettoization on
footbridges or streets that crossed Polish territory. Across Chlodna Street from the small
ghetto (about 100,000 residents) to the large ghetto (about 300,000 residents) gates could
be moved to block Gentile traffic and allow Jews to cross until a footbridge was erected
in January 1942. There were also footbridges over Przebieg and Saplezynska Streets.
Otherwise, only one situation remained where Jews and Gentiles might interact in
an uncontrolled atmosphere. The Municipal Courts at 53-55 Leszno Street fronted the
ghetto on Leszno Street. It was accessible on the Aryan side by a narrow corridor down
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Biala Street and from there along Chlodna Street between the large and small ghettoes.
Everyone had business to transact here so it was ideal for moving between the ghetto and
the rest of the city. Employees in the court were aware of the traffic and were quite
amenable to bribes. Ghetto survivor Hela Rufeisen recalled a Polish policeman there
asking her if she was Polish. Her response: “Sometimes yes, sometimes no.” 119
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decompressor
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Other than that, only illicit means remained for Jews to interact with their old
neighbors. Smuggling became a sole means of contact between the two. German officials
nominally tried to curb smuggling through terror, creating institutions for combating it,
increased punishments up to death and reshaped ghetto boundaries. Despite their efforts,
it thrived. Ghetto observers were skeptical of anti-smuggling measures anyway.
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Of all the anti-smuggling endeavors the changes one could ascribe to landscape
changes – restrictions on movement, boundary changes and enhanced observation – were
perhaps the most effective. Their implementation also reflected the changing attitude of
the Nazi leadership toward their Jewish captives, notably the changes spurred by the war
in Russia and the reverses suffered there.
The rude awakening of 16 November 1940 had left Varsovian Jewry without
sufficient means to provide for itself. Earlier impoverishment had already diminished this
capacity. For instance, Jews were not supposed to import furniture into the ghetto.
Despite fear of punishment, people did it anyway. Kaplan noted: “If we were to observe
the conquerors’ edicts literally we would die in a day. By law a Jew is not permitted to
remove the furniture when he vacates his apartment; in practice, however, the streets of
Warsaw are full of carts loaded with furniture.” 120 It was only natural, therefore, that
Jews would turn to a time-tested method for sustaining their lives: smuggling. As
Ringleblum noted: “There is good reason for the proverb that three things are
indomitable: the German Army, the British Isles, and Jewish smuggling.” 121
The ghetto landscape is the strongest evidence that Nazis intended their captives
to smuggle. Originally, the ghetto walls were erected between properties instead of the
center of streets. This allowed ghetto inmates to tunnel through bordering homes or to
walk across roofs. There was also less chance of surveillance since guards could not
actually patrol the entire border.
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Smuggling’s first incarnation was a passive and short-lived act. Poles would bribe
guards to overlook certain stretches of the wall that they might climb to purchase trade
goods from the impoverished Jews inside. Vladka Meed witnessed a particularly thriving
center of such activity, Parysowski Place. “Enterprising Gentiles scaled the ghetto wall to
purchase wearing apparel, underwear, shoes, sewing machines, and other items from the
Jews who, in their desperation, parted with their belongings for ridiculously small
sums.” 122 These are many of the same items Jews would lose upon entry into
concentration camps.
The greatest irony of this early smuggling was not the unfair compensation Meed
lamented but the irrevocable loss of livelihood the transactions represented. In losing
spare clothing and household goods, Jews were being degraded to subsistence survivors.
In losing items like sewing machines they were ceasing to be tailors, cottage industrialists
and self-sufficient households.
A seemingly effortless method of early ghetto smuggling was made possible by
the initial alignment of the ghetto with existing property boundaries and streets. This was
through downspouts. Money, milk, flour and sugar were easily sent through this way.
Jews inside the ghetto attached money to a string to be pulled up. Poles on the other side
used gravity to send the consumables back.
Another method that relied on the initial orientation of the ghetto was wall-to-wall
tunneling. This practice was the greatest boon to illicit trade as it made smuggling
without detection easy for anyone. German passage in the ghetto was already limited due
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to their need for a pass to enter beyond their guard posts at the gates. Now houses that
fronted the ghetto on one side and the ‘free’ city on the other became known as dens. A
hole in the wall at a den became a valuable thing. Czerniakow noted this joke: “[S]ome
Jewish fellow gave his daughter, as a dowry, a hole in the wall, which is in use 24 hours a
day.” 123 Resistance fighter Vladka Meed recalled a going rate of 75 zloty for using
someone’s hole to pass contraband through from one side to the other. 124 Polish
resistance fighter and Government-in-Exile liaison Jan Karski used this system to gather
intelligence about the ghetto. “With bribery, circumspection, a willingness to take the risk
of being caught, and a thorough knowledge of the cellars, the passage was comparatively
easy. Indeed, at that time, the building had become like a modern version of the River
Styx which connected the world of the living with the world of the dead.” 125
Of course, while the ghetto was directly linked to the Aryan side of Warsaw the
tops of buildings were open to smuggling, too. People could walk across rooftops and
utilize trapdoors in conjunction with their Polish partners. Symcha Binem Motyl likened
the late night process to a detective film. Smugglers met at a prearranged point, waited
for a signal, and then passed sacks and baskets of meats, fruits, vegetables and grains. 126
Finally, the original ghetto boundaries included the Jewish cemetery. Here was an
open space ideal for moving large goods. Grand pianos, disassembled machinery, even
live cattle moved through the cemetery. The cattle were especially important for the
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kosher consumption still observed by some Jews. They would become fewer and fewer as
the ghetto continued.
These methods, with the exception of the court were rendered obsolete when the
ghetto was reorganized by the exclusion or inclusion –usually exclusion – of more
territory. In part as an effort to combat smuggling, during 1941 the borders were
realigned with the centers of streets.
However on 3 June of the same year that border realignments were undertaken
supposedly to curb black marketeering, ghetto authorities had considered Czerniakow’s
proposal for Jews purchasing food in legal transactions to curb the black market. They
had considered it an ‘insult to authority.’ Smuggling was preferable to open JewishAryan relations.
Combating smuggling was only one reason for redrawing the borders. More
territory was needed in the city proper as war took its toll on the German homeland.
Whereas earlier the need for Lebensraum had caused Jews and Poles to be driven from
their homes, now it was the German need for shelter from bombing. Kaplan described the
German refugees in late 1940 as people who complained about the wealth their
compatriots were plundering in safe Poland. He included this scribble a German soldier
wrote on the side of a trolley. “We ride back and forth. We have no more homeland.” 127
The Russian war, begun in June 1941, intensified anti-Jewish measures on the
whole. The ghetto’s peak population in March 1941 of 460,000 added to the problem. As
the war heated up and Russians began bombing Warsaw, anti-Jewish measures took a
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new tint. At the ghetto’s founding and through its first months Nazi officials accepted
smuggling as a necessary fact for Varsovian Jews so long as they never actually left its
walls themselves. Even that proviso was overlooked in the face of bribes. They were
heard to utter sentences like: “How dare the Jews make such a proposal [importing milk
for infants] when they can satisfy all their needs with contraband?” 128 This attitude was
replaced by the death penalty in 1941. Ultimately it was replaced by the irrevocable
reorganization of the ghetto landscape with its destruction at the end of ghetto uprising in
May 1943.
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CHAPTER VI
During this time the three generally recognized categories of smuggler came into
their own. Authorities are largely agreed on this. In his book Resistance, Uprising leader
and historian Israel Gutman classified smugglers into three groups. The way each worked
with the situation is emblematic of the larger Nazi population policy.
The first was the highly organized and profitable “wholesale” smuggling. 129
Ringelblum reported enormous costs and profits from the coordinated groups. A group
could make 35,000 zloty in one week with costs – purchases on the Aryan side and bribes
– of only 19,000 zloty. 130 Such margins were possible because of what the bands were
bringing in. At highly inflated prices they sold “meats, fats, and luxury items…which
only the rich could afford, rather than potatoes and bread, which took up too much space
and were less profitable.” 131 Natan Zelichower described the benefits of this trade as “the
best food and drink.” 132 All it cost him were the goods he and his companions shipped
out and the bribes they paid their work supervisor to look the other way.
The audacity of this group was amazing. They acted as any regular, above-board
business might in Warsaw. The gates were open to them because of the bribes they paid
and therefore they did not need to use the other routes. Reports confirm that when this
group took to the walls it usually caused a controversy in the form of bullets from the
guards who were angered at missing the bribes they would have gotten had the shipment
come in through the gate.
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This class of smuggler did not exist to cure inequalities or feed the starving
masses. Szpilman took this view: “In fact the ghetto did not depend on smuggling to feed
itself.” 133 Indeed, some of the smugglers who moved the most merchandise were in the
pay of the Gestapo and can be more accurately labeled profiteers and collaborators rather
than resisters.
Altruism was not the business smuggler’s aim. Yet they were hardly stingy with
the profits. Ringelblum, who filled the role of impartial observer quite well, pointed out
the smuggler’s’ penchant for living the good life and code of honor in their conduct.
Their parties were renowned for the bulk of food served. This grew out of a sense of
immediacy in a smuggler’s life. Remember: “Smugglers love a good time, since they are
never sure how tomorrow will end (with a bullet, an informer, arrest) – so it’s eat, drink,
and be merry.” 134
Smugglers also maintained their groups at great cost. When a wagon was
intercepted or “burned” and the driver was imprisoned, his associates would support his
family in his absence and pay his legal fees. If any group member were killed his family
would likewise be cared for. 135 Never mind the fact that this business was in every sense
of the word illegal. Smugglers also took out insurance policies against burning. A firm
residing at 70 Nalewki Street insured wagons against burning at a base price with
additional rates for supplemental protection. 136
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Necessarily it required a great deal of bribery to run such a business or any
smuggling enterprise. Those receiving bribes included Polish Police (Blue), German
Criminal Police (Kripo), Jewish Police (Order), Ukrainian and Lithuanian guards and
plainclothes agents of the Transferstelle. Generally bribes ran at 100 zloty per cart. At the
time of Bischof’s appointment to the Transferstelle a kilogram of bread cost 12 zloty and
a kilogram of potatoes 3-4 zloty. For perspective, consider that in April 1942 ghetto
guards shot and beat smugglers who were bringing their cargo over the walls – which
usually only cost about 75 zloty. 137 The remaining smugglers were only allowed leave to
go once they had paid 40,000 zloty since that’s what their actions had cost the guards at
the going rate of 100 zloty per cart. To the criticism that perhaps this was overestimation,
keep in mind that the smugglers were able to pay the fee immediately. 138
Bribery is ubiquitous in its relation to illicit trade. Some discussion of it is
necessary to a better understanding. It is important to note here that bribery does not
always carry negative connotations. Neither can it be described as all good.
Czerniakow noted in correspondence the official acceptance of bribes from the
affluent to excuse them from labor details. The ‘ill-gotten’ money was then used to
remunerate the poor who were unable to skip work assignments. 139 These of course were
not the only bribes taken by the Judenrat or otherwise.
Ringelblum noted the omnipresent nature of bribery – including that which
Czerniakow advocated. A bribe paid to the Jewish Police could save one from labor in a
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Todt Organization work group. The requisite amount increased exponentially the further
one traveled to various assembly points after being rounded up. Five to 10 zloty were
sufficient when apprehended. At district assemblies the going rate was 100 zloty. If one
reached the central assembly 500 zloty were required to prevent leaving the Ghetto under
these circumstances. “Of course, it was the poor people, who didn’t have the money to
bribe the police, who went.” 140
Ringelblum’s diary is not the only evidence that proves the existence of such
schemes. The Jewish Police caught Samuel Puterman in one of the Ghetto-clearing
Aktionen. The officers charged him 30 to 50 zloty to send pleas to his family for the
necessary 3,000 zloty to be released from the Umschlagplatz 141. The money never
came. 142
As with other professions Jews had made a significant contribution to the Polish
legal community. However, practicing law in the Government-General required a special
permit. Jewish attorneys were denied this permit despite entreaties by Czerniakow. In
fact, no Jewish lawyers would be authorized to perform the job they had trained for until
28 were approved as consultants 11 March 1942, only three-and-a-half months before the
major deportations began. 143 Many of them turned to the Ordnungsdienst or Order
Service. Politically active diarist Hersh Wasser noted the make-up of the force. “Eighty
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per cent of them are rich men’s sons trying to avoid labor camps; and only incidentally do
they sport their uniforms and indulge their power instincts.” 144
A group of about 1,600 men, the Order Police – marked by their blue headbands
and badge insignia – were initially charged with regulating traffic flow, escorting work
battalions, preventing smuggling and otherwise maintaining control in the ghetto. Most
welcomed the sight of Jewish policemen at first, but the Order Service would eventually
assume more dubious roles and come to symbolize collaboration. Berg wrote in her diary
22 December 1940: “I experience a strange and utterly illogical feeling of satisfaction
when I see a Jewish policeman at a crossing – such policemen were completely unknown
in pre-war Poland.” 145 Ringelblum observed in his diary two months later: “The Jewish
populace sides with the Jewish policeman: ‘you would have minded a Polish policeman,
so why don’t you mind a Jewish one!’ There are intelligent policemen who dislike to
order people about.” 146
Since the Order Police received no wages, they were particularly open to bribery.
As Wasser noted in his diary: “Every platoon (50 people) keeps a kitty into which all pay
their earnings, later shared out equally. Police “earnings” consist of various pretextmonies from petty Jewish smugglers…bribes…and simple extortion.”147 In an attempt to
curb this weakness for bribes, Jewish policemen were entitled to Aryan Rations starting
21 June 1941. 148

144

Josef Kermisz, ed., “Daily Entries of Hersh Wasser, ”Yad Vashem Studies 15, Jerusalem, 1983, 247.
Berg, 34.
146
Ringelblum, 125-126. Entry of 19 February 1941.
147
Wasser, 247. Entry of 22 January 1941.
148
Kermisz et al, 251. Entry of 21 June 1941.
145

62

The organization’s history largely proves that any attempts to curb bribe
solicitation were ineffective. In December of 1942, Ringelblum explained the changed
perception of the Order Service. “The Jewish Police had a bad reputation even before the
deportation. Unlike the Polish Police, which did not take part in the abductions for the
labor camps, the Jewish Police did engage in this dirty work. The police were also
notorious for their shocking corruption and demoralization.” 149
The position of authority and potential for bribery attracted other elements besides
out of work professionals. Adler remarked that several criminals tried to join the Order
service. “Sometimes... a criminal would obstinately and arrogantly continue in his
attempt to get into the Service, even resorting to making threats against us.” 150 While
Adler maintains that he blocked attempts by known criminals to enter the service, they
found other outlets to authority and thereby easy money. One particularly persistent
applicant made a point of visiting to say he did not need the Order service anymore since
he had found work with the Gestapo. 151
While it is uncertain how this individual was being employed by the Gestapo,
given his predilection for police work, it is likely that he joined the Control Office for
Combating the Black Market and Profiteering in the Jewish District of Warsaw, also
known as the Thirteen for its address at 13 Leszno St. Established in the Autumn of 1940,
the Thirteen counted 500 personnel among its ranks. This became an outlet of
employment for professionals and refugees as several prominent members were from
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Lodz or elsewhere. Exactly who its administrators Abraham Gancwajch and David
Sternfeld answered to is uncertain. Evidence confirms that certain leaders – Gancwajch
and Sternfeld included – were aligned with the Gestapo. They certainly did not listen to
the Judenrat or the Transferstelle.
Like the Order Service, the Thirteen seemed to ape the German (Prussian) fetish
for uniforms. The men with green headbands –sometimes called foresters– were officially
to act as an extra bulwark against smuggling. Much like the Order Service, they
abysmally failed while pocketing large bribes or partaking in the illicit trade themselves.
Its leaders became known for excess and good living. They were rather unliked
because many suspected their allegiance to German officials that was only confirmed
after the war. Perhaps as an attempt to change this perception the Thirteen set up aid
stations and an Ambulance Service – light blue headbands. Two of its leaders – Morris
Kohn and Zelig Heller – were best-known for running the bus and rickshaw services,
called Kohnhellerki. A job there cost 1,000 zloty. 152 The two serve as an example of the
ghetto’s impression of the Thirteen. Szpilman derisively remembered Kohn and Heller as
magnates who were murdered because they bribed the wrong SS. 153
The Thirteen always bothered Czerniakow, both as a matter of administration and
personal taste. He once described a meeting with Gancwajch. “Gancwajch speaks as if he
were straining every word through his dirty saliva and washing it in his mouth before
uttering it.” 154 Auerswald eventually humored Czerniakow’s wishes and dissolved the
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Thirteen and placed its men and materiel under the auspices of the Judenrat by a decree
of 21 July 1941. 155
Czerniakow’s bribe redistribution scheme appears to be mildly philanthropic but
largely ineffective. The most powerful argument in support of the Judenrat’s policy is one
they may have never even been aware of. Those who went outside the walls were
empowered by their daily travels. And they understood this. Most Holocaust scholars
should recall how Jews valued the Ausweis 156 and vied for them. Ringelblum noted that
there was fierce competition to be on the trucks exiting the Ghetto for work. At 103 Plaza
Zelazna (Iron Place), where outside workers changed shifts, there was regularly a mob
attempting to board the trucks. It took fierce beatings and occasionally a killing to ward
off the surplus employees. “But why do they mob the truck? The answer is simple.
People working outside the Ghetto are given two good soups and half a kilo of bread a
day. That’s the reason for the mob.” 157
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A German policeman interrogating a Jew suspected of smuggling bread 1942 or 1943

Besides the ‘generous’ ration for themselves, these workers could make a big
difference for their families. Since they were paid, they had money to buy extra food
items from their Polish co-workers on the other side of the wall. They could bring this
food to their families or sell it to their neighbors. This was Gutman’s second group of
smugglers. They risked confiscation and a severe beating if they were caught, but the
potential reward was worth the risk. Thus, people who were being systematically starved
– remember the meager food ration the Transferstelle allowed into the Ghetto – were able
to procure additional sustenance and build a cash reserve for fluctuations in food prices.
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Police shakedowns outwardly have very little redeeming value. The Jewish Police
come across largely as profiteer bullies who only made the Aktionen possible. However,
their willingness to accept bribes was crucial to the professional smugglers’ employment.
Also, in their defense, they were men with families for whom they had to provide.
Those families were collateral for their good conduct and cooperation. A Jewish Police
officer known only as Julian explained himself thus, using the example of Jewish Police
in Minsk Mazowiecki who spurned their orders to assist in an Aktion. “Four hundred
policemen with the administration in the lead refused to assist. That same day within the
space of one hour the Germans shot all their families, nearly one thousand people. Then
they themselves carried out the Aktion.” 158
The second group of smugglers consisted of the aforementioned poor who could
not bribe their way out of work details but were paid in part with bribes the rich paid to
be excused. Their employment entitled them to work outside the ghetto. This group was
not as organized but nearly as effective. For the price of food on the outside– virtually
guaranteed to be cheaper as twelve zloty, on average, bought a loaf of bread in the Ghetto
and only 8.5 zloty were needed on the other side of the wall. 159 – they could feed their
families and bring in extra money for added security. The greatest risk they ran was a
beating at the gate for their daring since they generally did not have enough for a good
bribe. Szpilman recounted his first detail on the outside when he borrowed 50 zloty from
a coworker. Purchasing bread for 20 zloty and potatoes at 3 zloty a kilo, he sold them at
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50 and 18 zloty, respectively. “I had enough to eat for the first time in ages, and a little
working capital still in hand to make my purchases next day.” 160
From the first this group was a special one. They were the only inmates immune
to the dangers of imprisonment or deportation for exiting the ghetto. They too could carry
their goods directly through the gate. They did run the risk of an occasional beating and
confiscation but their extra cash insulated them and their families against starvation.
Finally, Gutman counted children as a separate group. They were often a last
ditch resource considering the risks they ran. When father and mother were out of
employment and had bartered off their last tradable goods, young people who could fit
through tight spaces, over walls and through gutters took their chance.
Children employed their talents on the Aryan side of the wall in one of two
pursuits: begging or petty trade. When there was no seed money to begin an operation
begging was the first option. Gutman noted, “…these children who slipped over to the
‘other side,’ begged, and were given some bread by the Poles (according to some
accounts, frequently by women who were known antisemites but who could not stand the
sight of hungry children).” 161
No good estimates exist for this classification. However, one may piece together
from their recollections that they were a largely ineffective group. Their difficulties
resulted from the nature of their smuggling. A child’s success at procuring food rested
almost exclusively on the ability to elicit pity. They were not employed so they had no
relationships with entrepreneurial Polish coworkers who would trade food for wages or
160
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goods. They also got no soup for their own fortification. Josef Ziemian’s Cigarette
Sellers of Three Crosses Square are the exception that proves the rule in this case.
Ziemian’s subject group, though at greater risk than their full-grown counterparts,
effectively employed illicit trade as a survival strategy.
Much like their elder, professional counterparts the children Ziemian profiled
displayed an uncanny comprehension of their situation. Interestingly, the cigarette sellers
turned down offers of assistance. Ziemian was active with the Jewish National Council
(ZKN). Through his connections, he was able to offer the boys and girls he found in
Warsaw money, dens (code for a safe shelter), and Polish papers. All but one of the
children refused the money. Only one child and an adult they found took the offer of a
den. The child, Bolus, was the youngest of the group at 9, and he was too much of a
liability to his friends. The adult was the Amchu-Man. His looks and age made passing as
an Aryan impossible. The false papers were too good to turn down, though. Considering
that schmalzers – Poles, or any Aryan, who would shake down a Jew at the threat of
turning him over to the Gestapo – generally began blackmailing by asking for papers –
and German officials who had to be obeyed were not above schmalzing – the papers were
invaluable.
The children expressed sentiments similar to those Ringelblum noted in the
professional set. Ziemian noted they constantly reminded themselves: “You only die
once.” 162 By their own admission, the cigarette sellers turned down money because it had
lost its typical meaning. “We don’t need money,” Bull – the 16-year-old leader of the
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cigarette leaders – told Ziemian the first time he offered the children 500 zloty. 163 When
Ziemian tried again later, Bull told him, “What do we need money for? We may be gone
tomorrow.” 164 When they made a big profit, the point was more acutely made. Two of the
Jewish exiles sold newspapers. When the Resistance snuck an entire run of “false news”
(reports of the war that accurately depicted Allied advances and German defeats) into the
streets the papers were eventually going for 50-100 zloty. With the big haul the two ate a
first-class dinner, bought fresh underwear, and restocked on cigarettes. Ziemian noted, “It
was not in their nature to store money for a later day.” 165
The children had other reasons to be wary of charity. Nazis frequently launched
operations to apprehend Jews under the guise of philanthropy. There is also reason to
believe that accepting an allowance could have endangered resourceful Jews like the
cigarette sellers, anyway. A charity-case was particularly vulnerable to blackmailers.
Their allowance was set. If they were robbed at the beginning of a pay period there would
be no money to sustain them for a week or more. Furthermore, the more people who were
aware of one’s surreptitious existence the greater the chances of being revealed.
Also in the tradition of their elder comrades, young smugglers did not stop when
they had enough food for their family. A 12-year-old named Hoppy took his starting fee
of 10 zloty, bought two loaves of bread with it, and sold the first for 14 zloty upon his
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return to the ghetto. The other loaf fed his family. The proceeds bought potatoes and
other food supplies. 166 The extra money was also necessary insurance against schmalzers.
There was a very real concept behind the edge to survival. A Jew on the Aryan
side daily confronted challenges that required creativity and a sincere will to live.
Nothing was free. Not even help. Just as freedom had to be purchased from schmalzers so
too did help. During his escape from the Ghetto one cigarette seller traversed the sewers
to the gentile part of Warsaw. Polish sewage workers discovered them and only offered
to lead their party for a fee of 1,000 zloty per person. The child did not have the fee,
payable at exit. Only quick thinking, quick movement, and his small size saved him, as
he maintained a low profile, kept quiet, and rushed through the manhole before anyone
could seize him. Arguably, someone living on the charity of one of the aid organizations
would be neither capable of paying the fee nor discovering a way out of the situation, for
they were the ones who were discovered in the first place – if only by another Jew, which
could be life-threatening – because of their inability to conceal the most dangerous secret
in early 1940s Warsaw.
Being smaller and without ready cash, the children were liable to suffer more and
perhaps die from their beatings. Nazis and diehard anti-Semitic Ukrainians knew the
children were useless for shakedowns and summarily executed them. If they did not die
in the course of winning food, the little smugglers were usually the last members of their
families to die. Should they make the transition from ghetto to the city proper, they often
proved adept at survival in hiding. Ziemian’s work and Gunnar Paulsson’s Secret City:
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The Hidden Jews of Warsaw are detailed studies that document this propensity on the part
of children. In Ziemian’s case, it was only with the aid of helpful young concealment
specialists that he was able to survive the war.
Child-beggars’ greatest danger lay in their economic circumstances. As
mendicants they had nothing of value, making shakedowns useless. This also prevented
them from paying bribes, particularly at ghetto gates. These unfortunate conditions
combined with the small physical stature of children (an attribute that ideally equipped
children to traverse the ghetto wall) made for people who were more likely to be abused
by zealots and were, perversely, less able to deal with the cruel treatment. Two episodes
that other Jews observed outline this cruel twist that both increased children’s
vulnerability and helplessness.
In one account a Jewish woman who was hiding as an Aryan recalled a small
Jewish boy (about 4 or 5 by her guess) who was begging at the corner of Jerusalem
Avenue and Krucza Street. No one gave him money, but they were forthcoming with
bread. Then, “An elegant German came by, opened a sewer-grating, took the child, and
threw him into the sewer.” 167Another woman of similar circumstances saw an SS
patrolman throw a Jewish boy of 10 into the “…dark and turbulent waters of the Vistula.
The boy did not even have time to utter a sound.” 168
The Jewish beggar-child’s lack of anything of value is the primary reason for their
summary executions by creative, cruel and efficient measures. When no financial gain
could be had from these young ones, many ‘Aryans’ chose instead a cruel act from which
167
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they could derive the satisfaction of perhaps serving the Fuhrer or exercising complete
control over another living creature. While there are many instances where overzealous
anti-Semites would not spare a Jew for any price or object – zealots always being ones to
disprove any economic theory – the majority of cases point to the supremacy of economic
concerns in how Germans, Poles, and Volksdeutsche dealt with the Jews they personally
encountered.
Other scholars combine children and outside employees – notably Barbara
Engelking and Jacek Leociak in their work The Warsaw Ghetto: A Guide to the Perished
City. Their reason for the distinction is unclear. The speculators remain in a class by
themselves. This study maintains the original three divisions with the provision that they
are the three maintained throughout the life of the ghetto. In the early period there was a
great deal more on a smaller scale that would not fit into these categories. This study also
adds resistance smuggling. Largely unrecorded and on a smaller scale, the unique
character of this group and what it transported commands a separate treatment.
Included under this heading are fighters and artists. The hidden – Paulsson’s
secret city – and archivists are also counted here. They smuggled weapons and culture.
They levied taxes and were protected for the contribution they made to Varsovian Jewry.
This group remained after the landscape changed for good with the destruction of the
ghetto and could be counted as the most successful of all the classifications.
Also briefly treated are the average people who bartered their tradable goods on
the ghetto border in the early days. This group usually did not leave but was met on the
inside of the wall by Poles willing to pay burn sale prices for furniture, clothing, cooking
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utensils or other valuables. Obviously, this venue was not long-lived as there was a finite
supply of useful goods for enticing enterprising people from Aryan Warsaw.
Eventually, as extermination took over from deportation in official policy,
smuggling would outlive its usefulness. It was easiest to date this shift to Frank signing
the death decree 15 October 1941. “Jews who leave their designated districts without
authorization will be subject to the death penalty.” A reminder from Fischer the following
month warned that the decree would be “applied with merciless severity.” 169 So on 22
November 1941 at the Gesia Street Prison twenty smugglers led singly from their cells
were tied to posts and blindfolded then shot by Jewish Order Police. Ringelblum, who
would prove to be accurate about smuggling and other trends, predicted it would not be
the end for the black market. “Smuggling flourishes, and will continue to flourish, so
long as the Germans have an interest in abetting it.” 170
He was correct. German allowance made for a continued smuggling underworld
until the middle of the following year. June 1942 would witness an unqualified change of
smuggling policy. A special Jewish Border Patrol was created with a 10 zloty daily wage
and better supply of fresh produce and bread to make them immune to bribe attempts. 171
In more violent and decisive measures, though, smugglers were rounded up at night.
Frankenstein – an unbribable guard who resembled Boris Karloff with a reported need to
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kill at least one Jew before breakfast daily – disguised himself as a Jew complete with
armband and shot smugglers in the act with a concealed machine gun. 172
Some form of smuggling continued until the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising was
overcome after just less than a month 15 May 1943, but its apex had passed. After the
major deportations began in the summer of 1942 the ghetto entered the shops period, so
called for the German workshops that operated in the greatly reduced ghetto. Nazis
commissioned scavengers to traverse empty sections of the ghetto to find items that had
been left behind. This could be the personal material warehoused in the “Canadas” 173 of
the Third Reich or useful equipment such as sewing machines. Some such scavengers
reported that they attempted to conceal some valuables for illicit trade.
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CONCLUSION
As long as the separation of ethnicities remained an end goal of Nazis, the
changing landscape of Warsaw remained an example of policy execution and the
evolution of the Final Solution. The barriers, physical and social, that Nazis erected
between their captive populations and themselves represented the embodiment of
ideology. Smuggling was a reaction to that and was effective until the ghetto’s
dissolution.
Economic warfare designed to remove an undesirable population from all regular
market interactions was the basis of the Nazi prerogatives that caused Jewish smuggling
in the Warsaw Ghetto. This warfare produced restrictions on the amount of currency Jews
could carry or hold in a bank, what and how much they could buy and where they were
allowed to travel or reside. Although on the face of it smuggling seems to be a basic
lifesaving reaction it also carries a sinister side in that it was a visible confirmation of the
achievement of Nazi goals.
For Nazis realized the benefits of ghettoization. Jews were degraded to playing
the part of huckster and conforming to the stereotypes Nazis had assigned them.
Additionally, smuggling confirmed that Judenfrei – indeed all untermenschenfrei –
utopias were a real possibility. In Germany proper before the Polish ghettos authorities
had only gone so far as the Law on Rental Relations 30 April 1939, limiting Jews to
living in Jewish-only apartments and requiring Jewish landlords to rent to other Jews.
Ghettoization was not attempted. In Poland, Jews – frequently with the assistance of
Poles – had to operate in another world separate from one any German would ever
traverse.
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Finally, smuggling in the Warsaw ghetto, though it did not cure inequalities or
feed the Jewish masses, gave Nazi leaders an excuse to shirk the responsibility for
sustaining a captive population cut off from its livelihood. Evidence solidly supports the
contention that Nazi officials were content to let Jews smuggle if it meant they did not
have to provide for them and they could continue to place unrealistic restrictions on the
amount of goods importable to the ghetto via the Transferstelle.
When larger Nazi plans evolved from separation to elimination, the enforcement
of anti-smuggling laws picked up. As the trains set out for Treblinka during the Great
Deportation during the summer of 1942, German police hunted more eagerly for
smugglers while Jewish firing squads were forced to execute them.
While this study is in itself worthwhile, it would be interesting to place it within
the wider framework of Nazi policy shifts. Nazi policy in Warsaw was somewhat of an
experiment and the ‘scientists’ in this case learned from their subjects and discovered that
the very acts which they thought could be resistance were in fact just a job well done to
the Nazis. Did this benefit of ghettoization get passed on to other German territories as
the marking decree did?
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